Turing’s imitation game and human thought

In 1950, the English mathematician Alan Mathison Turing proposed the basis of what some authors consider the test that a machine must pass to establish that it can think. This test is basically a game; nevertheless, it has had great infl uence in the development of the theories of the mind performance. The game specifications and some of its repercussions in the conception of thinking, the consciousness and the human will, will be ramifications of the path that will take us through the beginning of the artificial intelligence, passing along some of its singular manifestations, to culminate in the posing of certain restrictions of its fundaments.

A Strategic-Equilibrium Based

The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form, a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all players.  This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the stronger player paradox.  A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game.    [298-words]

Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach

We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.