Experiences, sensations and demands of citizen (in)security: recent complex configurations in Argentina

Over the last decades the issue of insecurity due to an increase in crime rates and its possible impact on the stability of Latin American democracies has sparked an ongoing debate. In this context, the present article studies, for the case of Argentina, how experiences and sensations of insecurity may be articulated to demands for greater punitive rigor. The analysis is based on two types of information. Initially, data from international surveys such as Latinoabarometer are considered. Then, these are compared to data from prolonged on-site observations in a poor neighborhood of a mid-sized Argentine city. The combination of these different types of data shows the complexity of the process. Contrary to what is often assumed, experiences and sensations of insecurity do not lineally lead to demands for greater punitive rigor. The way in which social actors elaborate their experiences of insecurity is highly situational and not systematic. We have found that there is not necessarily a consistent process of ‘meaning construction’ that articulates experiences and sensations of insecurity with political demands.

Modelo de gestión del conocimiento para una empresa del sector de insumos químicos para la industria farmacéutica, cosmética y de alimentos: caso Disaromas S.A.

La creación de conocimiento al interior de las organizaciones es visible mediante la dirección adecuada del conocimiento de los individuos, sin embargo, cada individuo debe interactuar de tal manera que forme una red o sistema de conocimiento organizacional que consolide a largo plazo las empresas en el entorno en el que se desenvuelven. Este documento revisa elementos centrales acerca de la gestión de conocimiento visto desde varios autores y perspectivas e identifica puntos clave para diseñar un modelo de gestión de conocimiento para una empresa del sector de insumos químicos para la industria farmacéutica, cosmética y de alimentos de la ciudad de Bogotá.

Heterogeneity and the formation of risk - sharing coalitions

We offer a new explanation of partial risk sharing based on coalition formation and segmentation of society in a risky environment, without assuming limited commitment and imperfect information. Heterogenous individuals in a society freely choose with whom they will share risk. A partition belonging to the core of the membership game obtains. Perfect risk sharing does not necessarily arise. Focusing on mutual insurance rule and assuming that individuals only differ with respect to risk, we show that the core partition is homophily-based. The distribution of risk affects the number and size of these coalitions. Individuals may pay a lower risk premium in riskier societies. A higher heterogeneity in risk leads to a lower degree of risk sharing. We discuss how the endogenous partition of society into risk-sharing coalitions may shed light on empirical evidence on partial risk sharing. The case of heterogenous risk aversion leads to similar results.