The three systems for the protection of fundamental human rights in the European Union and exceptional measures against terrorism: the case of extraordinary extraditions (the CIA flights) with special reference to the Spanish case

This document is aimed first of all, make a small introductory reference on the three levels of protection of fundamental rights in Europe with the idea of helping to clarify and understand mainly to non-European systems that we are not talking. For that, based on this, going on to assess the impact generated in these systems suggest that the complaints alleged involvement of European countries in secret CIA flights to combat international terrorism, as well as investigate the responses that have given each protection of these areas to try to clarify them. 

Self-organized sociopolitical interactions as the best way to achieve organized patterns in human social systems: going beyond the top-down control of classical political regimes

La monografía presenta la auto-organización sociopolítica como la mejor manera de lograr patrones organizados en los sistemas sociales humanos, dada su naturaleza compleja y la imposibilidad de las tareas computacionales de los regímenes políticos clásico, debido a que operan con control jerárquico, el cual ha demostrado no ser óptimo en la producción de orden en los sistemas sociales humanos. En la monografía se extrapola la teoría de la auto-organización en los sistemas biológicos a las dinámicas sociopolíticas humanas, buscando maneras óptimas de organizarlas, y se afirma que redes complejas anárquicas son la estructura emergente de la auto-organización sociopolítica.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.