Neighborhood characteristics and the spatial concentration of crime: Evidence for Bogotá

Using a unique neighborhood crime dataset for Bogotá in 2011, this study uses a spatial econometric approach and examines the role of socioeconomic and agglomeration variables in explaining the variance of crime. It uses two different types of crime, violent crime represented in homicides and property crime represented in residential burglaries. These two types of crime are then measured in non-standard crime statistics that are created as the area incidence for each crime in the neighborhood. The existence of crime hotspots in Bogotá has been shown in most of the literature, and using these non-standard crime statistics at this neighborhood level some hotspots arise again, thus validating the use of a spatial approach for these new crime statistics. The final specification includes socioeconomic, agglomeration, land-use and visual aspect variables that are then included in a SARAR model an estimated by the procedure devised by Kelejian and Prucha (2009). The resulting coefficients and marginal effects show the relevance of these crime hotspots which is similar with most previous studies. However, socioeconomic variables are significant and show the importance of age, and education. Agglomeration variables are significant and thus more densely populated areas are correlated with more crime. Interestingly, both types of crimes do not have the same significant covariates. Education and young male population have a different sign for homicide and residential burglaries. Inequality matters for homicides while higher real estate valuation matters for residential burglaries. Finally, density impacts positively both crimes.

Unemployment insurance : severance payments and informality in developing countries

We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersídecision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance payments mechanism.