Biased Technological Change, Impatience and Welfare

En este artículo utilizamos un modelo de generaciones traslapadas con heterogeneidad en la tasa de impaciencia para mostrar que los efectos de un cambio tecnológico aumentador de capital no son simétricos en los agentes y pueden conllevar una reducci on en el consumo. La asimetría en la tasa de impaciencia de los agentes en un período, tiene consecuencias sobre los beneficios del cambio tecnológico para las generaciones futuras. Menores tasas de impaciencia llevan a mayores niveles de capital y de consumo, si se entiende que la economía tiene el suficiente nivel de capital per capita.

The new Facultad de Ciencias Naturales y Matemáticas at the Universidad del Rosario “Knowledge for sustainable development and welfare of society”

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Rebellion, repression and welfare

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.

Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare

We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care quality and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations). Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different objective i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante providers’ horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers.