The effect of Ponzi schemes on crime: Evidence from the colombian case

This paper estimates the impact of a massive negative income shock led by the simultaneous crash down of several Ponzi schemes (also known as financial ``pyramids"") in Colombia on crime rates at the municipal level. Using novel data on the spatial incidence of the latest wave of Colombian pyramids and their crash down date, I estimate difference-in-differences models with both monthly and yearly frequency. I find that the negative income shock of the pyramids" crash down differentially exacerbates crime in affected municipalities compared to those with no presence of Ponzi schemes. This is true for minor offenses like commercial theft or residential burglary, but not for major crimes as murder or terrorism.

Biased Technological Change, Impatience and Welfare

En este artículo utilizamos un modelo de generaciones traslapadas con heterogeneidad en la tasa de impaciencia para mostrar que los efectos de un cambio tecnológico aumentador de capital no son simétricos en los agentes y pueden conllevar una reducci on en el consumo. La asimetría en la tasa de impaciencia de los agentes en un período, tiene consecuencias sobre los beneficios del cambio tecnológico para las generaciones futuras. Menores tasas de impaciencia llevan a mayores niveles de capital y de consumo, si se entiende que la economía tiene el suficiente nivel de capital per capita.

El sistema multifondos de pensiones colombiano bajo las nuevas teorías del comportamiento financiero

En Colombia, después de casi dos décadas de la creación del régimen de cuentas privadas, se implementó una reforma donde se pasa de un sistema con un unico fondo a uno multifondos. Este tipo de reformas se vienen implementando en diferentes paises europeos y de Latino America. A la luz de las teorías clásicas dicha reforma trae mejoras en el bienestar de los individuos; sin embargo, la literatura sobre las nuevas teorías del comportamiento sugiere que los individuos no siempre toman decisiones que están de acuerdo con los supuestos de las teorías clásicas. Este trabajo estudia esta reforma en Colombia bajo algunas de las teorías del comportamiento financiero. Se encuentra que aún cuando el afiliado se quede en la opción default , o actúe con aversión a la pérdida, va a obtener valores en sus cuentas privadas mayores a las que obtendría con un sistema de un único fondo.

El sistema multifondos de pensiones colombiano bajo las nuevas teorías del comportamiento financiero

En Colombia, después de casi dos décadas de la creación del régimen de cuentas privadas, se implementó una reforma donde se pasa de un sistema con un único fondo a uno multifondos. Este tipo de reformas se vienen implementando en diferentes países europeos y de Latino América. A la luz de las teorías clásicas dicha reforma trae mejoras en el bienestar de los individuos; sin embargo, la literatura sobre las nuevas teorías del comportamiento sugiere que los individuos no siempre toman decisiones que están de acuerdo con los supuestos de las teorías clásicas. Este trabajo estudia esta reforma en Colombia bajo algunas de las teorías del comportamiento financiero. Se encuentra que aún cuando el afiliado se quede en la opción default , o actúe con aversión a la pérdida, va a obtener valores en sus cuentas privadas mayores a las que obtendría con un sistema de un único fondo.

The new Facultad de Ciencias Naturales y Matemáticas at the Universidad del Rosario “Knowledge for sustainable development and welfare of society”

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Rebellion, repression and welfare

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare

We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care quality and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations). Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different objective i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante providers’ horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers.

Economic shocks and crime: evidence from the crash of ponzi schemes

In November 2008, Colombian authorities dismantled a network of Ponzi schemes, making hundreds of thousands of investors lose tens of millions of dollars throughout the country. Using original data on the geographical incidence of the Ponzi schemes, this paper estimates the impact of their break down on crime. We find that the crash of Ponzi schemes differentially exacerbated crime in affected districts. Confirming the intuition of the standard economic model of crime, this effect is only present in places with relatively weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and with little access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as microcredit. In addition, we show that, with the exception of economically-motivated felonies such as robbery, violent crime is not affected by the negative shock.