Plan de mercadeo y logístico para una comercializadora de maquinaría, equipos y artículos para la industria alimenticia

Cormatec Ltda., es una empresa colombiana, dedicada a la comercialización de maquinaria, equipos y artículos para la industria del procesamiento de alimentos, hoteles, restaurantes, carnicerías, frigoríficos y empresas similares. En los últimos años, la empresa ha presentado importantes problemas de disminución de ventas, debido en principio a la fuerte competencia que existe en el sector. Por tal motivo, el presente plan de mercadeo y logístico, busca diagnosticar las causas del bajo rendimiento presentado en la organización en los últimos periodos y proponer soluciones que maximicen las utilidades de la empresa.

Confianza inversionista. Inversión extranjera directa en Colombia. Periodo 2002–2010

Desde el surgimiento de las doctrinas económicas sobre el crecimiento endógeno, se ha determinado que la inversión extranjera es un factor que contribuye al crecimiento económico, ya que facilita la transferencia de tecnología y conocimientos en técnicas de producción, de mercadeo y de gestión en mercado extranjeras donde la competencia permite la existencia de incrementos en la productividad de los factores. Hacia el año 2000 la política de IED en Colombia, contemplaba unas políticas de gobierno centradas en la paz, reformas estructurales y promoción a las exportaciones. Dadas estas condiciones, los retos concernientes a aumentar la inversión extranjera eran bastante exigentes al momento de iniciar el periodo de gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002 – 2010), razón por la cual el objetivo de esta investigación es analizar los resultados al finalizar los dos periodos consecutivos de mandato del Presidente Uribe. Durante su gobierno, el Presidente Uribe Vélez, logró que la inversión extranjera directa alcanzara un notable incremento en sectores específicos como el minero y el petrolero, acompañando el proceso de crecimiento económico, sin embargo, este crecimiento no figura generalizado y contrariamente los índices de desempleo se incrementaron y las utilidades generadas se convierten en remesas al exterior conllevando baja reinversión en el país y estancamiento de otros sectores. Centraré la investigación en las situaciones inicial y final del periodo presidencial, en los aspectos concernientes a los niveles de inversión captados en Colombia, los sectores más favorecidos con dicha inversión, el origen de los recursos y la relación que estos flujos han tenido en los resultados de indicadores de crecimiento económico, productividad, competitividad, empleo y reinversión de utilidades.

Agricultural sector and competition in Colombia

In this chapter we provide a summary description of Colombian Competition Policy with an emphasis on the agricultural sector. Key developments and recent changes in institutional arrangements affecting competition policy, as it applies to the agricultural sector, are highlighted. Illustrative case studies are depicted to show the richness and complexity of policy developments and enforcement. Some general conclusions are drawn from this examination.

Competition between HMO and PPO: A Two-Sided Market Approach

We set-up a two-sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholderson one side and providers on the other side. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two-sided framework allows to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers’ side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of competition mainly depends on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO gets a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that our model, by highlighting the two-sided market structure of the health plans’ competition, provides new insights to understand the increase in the PPOs’ market share observed during the last decade in the US.

Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.