Cambios en el régimen de pensiones en Colombia y su efecto en el margen intensivo de la oferta laboral

En Colombia, como en muchos países de América Latina, en los años 80 y 90 se hicieron cambios importantes en los regímenes de pensiones. Este trabajo hace un análisis de uno de esos cambios en Colombia. El cambio consistió en aumentar el tiempo de cotización necesario para reclamar los beneficios pensionales y la inclusión del salario dentro de la fórmula del monto de pensiones. Para este propósito se estudia el impacto sobre la oferta laboral de un cambio exógeno en estas condiciones usando un diseño de regresión discontinua. Se encuentra un efecto positivo sobre las horas promedio trabajadas en la semana.

Les mesures d’éloignement et le droit à la vie privée et familiale des étrangers en europe

La regulación de los flujos migratorios en Europa produce unatensión constante entre el ejercicio soberano del control fronterizo y eldeber estatal de respeto a los derechos humanos. En este sentido, la CorteEuropea de Derechos Humanos ha desarrollado una jurisprudencia quetrata de restablecer el equilibrio entre el respeto a la vida privada y familiarde los extranjeros y la legitimidad de las medidas de alejamiento dictadas porlos Estados. Este artículo de reflexión estudia la aplicación del artículo 8 dela Convención Europea de los Derechos Humanos: “Derecho al respectode la vida privada y familiar”, teniendo en cuenta el llamado margen nacionalde apreciación de los Estados y el análisis de la proporcionalidad, en lajurisprudencia de la Corte. Acto seguido, esta reflexión muestra la evoluciónjurisprudencial en la materia, para finalizar con un balance entre la efectividaddel artículo 8 de la Convención, habida cuenta del endurecimientode las condiciones y garantías dadas a la población extranjera en Europay de la adaptación de las legislaciones nacionales a los mandatos de la Corte.

An analysis of the relationship between wages in the public and private sector in colombia : a panel data approach

This document examines the time-series properties of the wage differentials that arise between the public and private sector in Colombia during the sample period 1984 to 2005. We Find conflicting results in unit-root and stationary tests when looking at wage differentials at an aggregate level (such as for men, women or both). However, when we analyse wage differentials at higher levels of disaggregation, treat them jointly as a panel of data, and allow for the presence of potential cross section dependence, there is more supportive evidence for the view that wage differentials are stationary. This implies that although wage differentials do exist, they have not been consistently increasing (or decreasing) over time.

Business cycle asymmetries: Loss aversion, sticky prices, and wages

In this chapter, the Smets-Wouters (2003) New Kenesian model is reformulated by introducing the loss aversion utility function developed in chapter two. The purpose of this is to understand how asymmetric real business cycles are linked to asymmetric behavior of agents in a price and wage rigidities set up. The simulations of the model reveal not only that the loss aversion in consumption and leisure is a good mechanism channel for explaining business cycle asymmetries, but also is a good mechanism channel for explaining asymmetric adjustment of prices and wages. Therefore the existence of asymmetries in Phillips Curve. Moreover, loss aversion makes downward rigidities in prices and wages stronger and also reproduces a more severe and persistent fall of the employment. All in all, this model generates asymmetrical real business cycles, asymmetric price and wage adjustment as well as hysteresis.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.