La migración temporal asistida de AIESEC: ¿Una fuerza transnacional que opera en el mercado laboral en Colombia?

Este trabajo de grado busca brindar una mirada internacionalista al Estudio de caso Alianza estratégica entre AIESEC en Colombia y SABMiller durante el periodo 2008 – 2011. El trabajo de grado tiene como objetivo identificar la influencia o no influencia de la migración temporal asistida en el mercado laboral, con base en el análisis de la teoría liberal de las relaciones internacionales y por medio de un análisis macroeconómico de Colombia. Finalmente el estudio de caso permite dilucidar hallazgos de influencia de este tipo de migración en el mercado laboral en Colombia y como la economía del país podría verse beneficiada por el accionar de una ONG como AIESEC.

Spatial Inequalities and Social Utility: Mobility Efforts and Accessibility in Greater Santiago

Emergent phenomena such as urban sprawl, travel intensification and loss of cohesion in contemporary metropolises, impose stronger constraints on its inhabitants. Among them, travel and location capabilities become a fundamental factor of social integration and a multiplier of income inequalities. The simultaneous analysis of housing-travel efforts and accessibility to urban opportunities in Greater Santiago shows that these dimensions are closely related and exert an important influence on spatial mobility and inequalities among its inhabitants. Furthermore, a theoretical model of displacements, considering income and location, confirms the importance of proximity and non-motorized transport in order to optimize daily mobility strategies of households. Overall, the empirical and theoretical results presented show the need to implement coordinated planning strategies between the housing and transport sectors, addressing not only travel acceleration, but mainly the consistency between accommodation and opportu  ties location. The creation of such planning tools could be a more sustainable alternative than current growth trends in Greater Santiago.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.