El problema de conceptualización del terrorismo dentro de la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales: Un análisis desde la perspectiva histórico conceptual

Los hechos ocurridos durante el 11 de septiembre de 2001 se constituyeron como un momento fundamental en los intentos de conceptualización del terrorismo internacional dentro de la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales. A raíz del 9/11 tuvo lugar la resemantización del concepto de terrorismo internacional en función del terrorismo religioso y del fundamentalismo islámico. Lo anterior, marco una ruptura en el campo de experiencia y en el horizonte de expectativas del concepto mismo, pues este último adquirió un nuevo uso discursivo, y por ende, político. Por eso, ante la necesidad de emprender un análisis discursivo de los usos del concepto de terrorismo internacional, se evidencia cómo al estar inmersos en determinados juegos del lenguaje, el uso discursivo de este concepto termina por convertirse en una herramienta de acción política que promueve una forma de vida.

Turing’s imitation game and human thought

In 1950, the English mathematician Alan Mathison Turing proposed the basis of what some authors consider the test that a machine must pass to establish that it can think. This test is basically a game; nevertheless, it has had great infl uence in the development of the theories of the mind performance. The game specifications and some of its repercussions in the conception of thinking, the consciousness and the human will, will be ramifications of the path that will take us through the beginning of the artificial intelligence, passing along some of its singular manifestations, to culminate in the posing of certain restrictions of its fundaments.

Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach

We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.