Equilibrium Principle in Colombian Public Contracting

Public contracting in Colombia is conflicting and inefficient. It frequently leads to damage to State property. The Colombian legal system cannot assure efficient and transparent public contracting. The cause is the institutional environment characterized by high transaction costs. Colombian law worsens the process by recognizing the principle of economic equilibrium in public contracts. This principle increasese contract incompleteness and renders impossible the use of economic incentives to control the opportunism of the economic agents. The authors present the hypothesis that the economic equilibrium principle increases the conflictive nature of public contracting. They test the hypothesis empirically. The first section of the paper presents a summary of the literature on transaction costs economics, as well as the legal literature on the historical origin and the content of the economic equilibrium principle. The second section describes the methodology of the empirical study. The third section shows the empirical evidence of the effects that the economic equilibrium principle exerts over the public contracting. The last section presents the conclusions.

Recognition of static and dynamic facial expressions: Influences of sex, type and intensity of emotion

Ecological validity of static and intense facial expressions in emotional recognition has been questioned. Recent studies have recommended the use of facial stimuli more compatible to the natural conditions of social interaction, which involves motion and variations in emotional intensity. In this study, we compared the recognition of static and dynamic facial expressions of happiness, fear, anger and sadness, presented in four emotional intensities (25 %, 50 %, 75 % and 100 %). Twenty volunteers (9 women and 11 men), aged between 19 and 31 years, took part in the study. The experiment consisted of two sessions in which participants had to identify the emotion of static (photographs) and dynamic (videos) displays of facial expressions on the computer screen. The mean accuracy was submitted to an Anova for repeated measures of model: 2 sexes x [2 conditions x 4 expressions x 4 intensities]. We observed an advantage for the recognition of dynamic expressions of happiness and fear compared to the static stimuli (p < .05). Analysis of interactions showed that expressions with intensity of 25 % were better recognized in the dynamic condition (p < .05). The addition of motion contributes to improve recognition especially in male participants (p < .05). We concluded that the effect of the motion varies as a function of the type of emotion, intensity of the expression and sex of the participant. These results support the hypothesis that dynamic stimuli have more ecological validity and are more appropriate to the research with emotions.

A Strategic-Equilibrium Based

The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form, a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all players.  This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the stronger player paradox.  A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game.    [298-words]

Poverty impacts of agricultural policy adjustments in an opening economy: the case of Colombia

We aim to contribute to the assessment of poverty impacts on the rural sector arising from agricultural policy adjustments in Colombia. For this we use an agriculture specialized static CGE model, jointly (sequentially) with a microsimulation model that allows for effective job relocation. Results indicate that the sectoral impact of the program implemented tends to be small and has considerable variability across crops. They also show that the highest impacts come from the irrigation and land improvements component of the program. Lastly, although it reduces poverty, poverty impacts are small and tend to concentrate in rural households toward the middle of the income distribution ladder.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

The international economic crisis and the colombian economy

The purpose of this research is to provide an approximation to the likely effects of the crisis on the Colombian economy and to the effectiveness of policy response. For this, the most relevant transmission channels and policy measures are simulated in the setting of a static computable general equilibrium model (CGE). The results obtained are interesting in their own right and are in line with what could be expected given the information available on the behavior of the Colombian economy. Furthermore, they call into question the effectiveness of governmental intervention as judged by its intended countercyclical effects.

Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector

We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI benefits, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits or long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed worker´s effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort.The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. We provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength. This result softens the widespread opinion, usually based on the microeconomic/partial equilibrium argument that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.

Comentarios sobre la propuesta de reforma a la estructura arancelaria colombiana

En este estudio se evalúan los efectos estáticos de una reciente propuesta de reforma a la actual estructura arancelaria aplicada por Colombia. La propuesta, realizada por el gobierno, estaba dirigida a racionalizar dicha estructura y a propiciar un mejoramiento de la productividad de la industria, pero fue desechada en vista de la oposición del sector privado a la misma. La evaluación se hace mediante un modelo de equilibrio general computable multipaís. Sus resultados indican que la no implementación de la propuesta implica renunciar a las ganancias de bienestar esperables de una combinación de ésta y de la implementación de los acuerdos que hacen parte de la agenda comercial del país.