Friendly Settlements in the Framework of the Inter- American Human Rights System

The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights provides that disputesbetween States and victims of human rights violations or their representatives can beresolved through a friendly settlement. In this arrangement, conducted before the regionalorgans of protection of human rights, the State accepts its international responsibility,commits itself to investigate and judge the responsible and makes commitmentson compensation to the offended, the victims, on his part, renounce to take the caseto the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commissionmonitors the legal consistency of the agreement and holds the role of independentobserver. What are these agreements, what possibilities and limitations provide to theopposing parties and, above all, what kind of reparation offer to victims of humanrights violations are issues to resolve in this article.

Does the unemployment benefit institution affect the productivity of workers? evidence from a field experiment

We investigate whether and how the type of unemployment benefit institution affects productivity. We designed a field experiment to compare workers’ productivity under a welfare system, where the unemployed receive an unconditional monetary transfer, with their productivity under a workfare system, where the transfer is received conditional on the unemployed spending some time on ancillary activities. First, we find that having an unemployment benefit institution, regardless of whether it makes transfers conditional or unconditional, increases workers’ productivity. Second, we find that productivity is higher under Welfare than under Workfare. Becoming unemployed under Welfare comes at the psychological cost of a drop in self-esteem, presumably due to the shame or stigma associated with receiving an unconditional unemployment benefit. We document the empirical relevance of precisely this channel. The differences we observe in productivity suggest that this psychological cost acts as an extra nonmonetary incentive for workers under Welfare to put a higher effort in their work.