An analysis of the relationship between wages in the public and private sector in colombia : a panel data approach

This document examines the time-series properties of the wage differentials that arise between the public and private sector in Colombia during the sample period 1984 to 2005. We Find conflicting results in unit-root and stationary tests when looking at wage differentials at an aggregate level (such as for men, women or both). However, when we analyse wage differentials at higher levels of disaggregation, treat them jointly as a panel of data, and allow for the presence of potential cross section dependence, there is more supportive evidence for the view that wage differentials are stationary. This implies that although wage differentials do exist, they have not been consistently increasing (or decreasing) over time.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.