La retroalimentación facial y su efecto en la evaluación de publicidad de humor

La hipótesis de retroalimentación facial planteada por Tomkins en 1962 sustenta que la activación de algunos músculos faciales envía información sensorial al cerebro y se induce entonces una experiencia emocional en el sujeto. Partiendo de dicha teoría y de investigaciones que la sustentan, el presente estudio se propuso confirmar el efecto de la emoción inducida a través de la retroalimentación facial sobre la evaluación de cinco tipos de humor en publicidad. Para ello se realizó un experimento con 60 hombres y 60 mujeres, que fueron asignados aleatoriamente a una de dos condiciones: estimulación de sonrisa –músculos hacia arriba- o inhibición de sonrisa –músculos hacía abajo-, mientras evaluaban 16 imágenes de publicidad de humor. A partir del análisis de los resultados se encontraron diferencias significativas entre las condiciones; en línea con la hipótesis formulada, los participantes expuestos a la condición estimulación de sonrisa –músculos hacía arriba- evaluaron más positivamente los comerciales. También se encontraron diferencias significativas en función del sexo y los tipos de humor evaluados. El estudio ofrece evidencia empírica de la teoría propuesta hace más de medio siglo y su efecto en el ámbito de la publicidad actual.

Mixed oligopoly in education

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on ìpeer groupî e§ects. In the Örst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they Öx their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a§ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e§ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting of extreme di§erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then introduce a peer group e§ect which, for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signiÖcant impact on the results. The mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e§ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.

Pre-school contributions to future achievements

This paper provides recent evidence about the beneÖts of attending preschool on future performance. A non-parametric matching procedure is used over two outcomes: math and verbal scores at a national mandatory test (Saber11) in Colombia. It is found that students who had the chance of attending preschool obtain higher scores in math (6.7%) and verbal (5.4%) than those who did not. A considerable fraction of these gaps comes from the upper quintiles of studentís performance, suggesting that preschool matters when is done at high quality institutions. When we include the number of years at the preschool, the gap rises up to 12% in verbal and 17% in math.

The design of optimal education policies when individuals differ in inherited wealth and ability

In this paper I consider the role of education poli-cies in redistribution of income when individuals differ in two aspects: ability and inherited wealth. I discuss the extent to which the rules that emerge in unidimensional settings apply also in the bidimen-sional setting considered in this paper. The main conclusion is that, subject to some qualifi cations, the same type of rules that determine optimal education policies when only ability heterogeneity is considered apply to the case where both parameters of heterogeneity are considered. The qualifi cations pertain to the implementation of the optimal alloca-tion of resources to education and not the way the optimal allocations fi rst- and second-best differ.