Labour market, international trade, and unemployment in a less developed country

This paper constructs a trade general equilibrium model for a less developed country with three sectors. One is the informal and un-tradable sector characterized by áexible wages, while the other two sectors are tradable, export and import sectors. The model imposes a binding minimum wage over the unskilled labour and e¢ cient wage distortions on the skilled labour. Comparative statics is driven to analyze the e§ects on the labour market as consequence of opening the economy, raising the minimum wage and the introduction of an augmenting productivity in the export sector.

Unemployment insurance : severance payments and informality in developing countries

We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersídecision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance payments mechanism.

Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector

We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI benefits, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits or long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed worker´s effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort.The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. We provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength. This result softens the widespread opinion, usually based on the microeconomic/partial equilibrium argument that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.

Does the unemployment benefit institution affect the productivity of workers? evidence from a field experiment

We investigate whether and how the type of unemployment benefit institution affects productivity. We designed a field experiment to compare workers’ productivity under a welfare system, where the unemployed receive an unconditional monetary transfer, with their productivity under a workfare system, where the transfer is received conditional on the unemployed spending some time on ancillary activities. First, we find that having an unemployment benefit institution, regardless of whether it makes transfers conditional or unconditional, increases workers’ productivity. Second, we find that productivity is higher under Welfare than under Workfare. Becoming unemployed under Welfare comes at the psychological cost of a drop in self-esteem, presumably due to the shame or stigma associated with receiving an unconditional unemployment benefit. We document the empirical relevance of precisely this channel. The differences we observe in productivity suggest that this psychological cost acts as an extra nonmonetary incentive for workers under Welfare to put a higher effort in their work.

Seasonal adjustment and cointegration

El documento examina el efecto de filtros de ajuste en el tamaño y poder de prueba de cointegración que usan los residuales como pruebas ADF y PP, mediante procedimientos MonteCarlo y una aplicación empírica. Nuestros resultados indican que el uso de filtros distorsiona el tamaño y reduce el poder de estas pruebas.

Technical instruments and conceptual definitions: theoretical and practical implications of the change on the definition of unemployment in Colombia

En junio de 2000 el Departamento Nacional de Estadística de Colombia adopto una nueva definición de medición de desempleo siguiendo los estándares sugeridos por la organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT). El cambio de definición implico una reducción de la tasa de desempleo en cerca de dos puntos porcentuales. En este documento contrastamos la experiencia colombiana con otra experiencias internacionales, y analizamos las implicaciones empíricas y teóricas de este cambio de definición usando dos tipos de estimaciones cuantitativas: en la primera se contrasta las principales características de las diferentes categorías clasificadas según la definición nueva y vieja de desempleo (empleado, desempleado y fuera de la fuerza laboral) usando el algoritmo EM; en la segunda se pone a prueba la implicación del desempleo estructural y su relación con el perfil educacional de personas desempleadas y las características teóricas que enfrentan los estándares de la OIT en la definición de empleo.

Does High Unemployment Rate Result in a High Divorce Rate?: A Test for Japan.

El objetivo de este artículo es determinar si el incremento en la tasa de desempleo tiene algún efecto sobre la tasa de divorcios. Con este fin se utilizan series de tiempo y datos de corte transversal para Japón. También se incluyen la tasa de crimenes y el promedio de las horas trabajadas como variables explicativas. Adicionalmente se efectúa análisis de cointegración con el fin de evitar relaciones espúreas entre las series de tiempo. Los resultados sugieren que existe una correlación positiva entre la tasa de desempleo y la tasa de divorcios. También confirmamos que existe una relación cronológica cercana entre el desempleo y el divorcio.