La Diplomacia del Jazz como una estrategia de política exterior de Estados Unidos durante la Guerra Fría

En aras de contener el comunismo y expandir la cultura norteamericana y los valores de democracia y libertad, Estados Unidos lanzó una estrategia de política exterior denominada la Diplomacia del Jazz, que consistía en promocionar internacionalmente el jazz mediante dos artificios: primero, la celebración de conciertos de los intérpretes más representativos de este género en diferentes partes del mundo; y segundo, la trasmisión de programas radiales sobre jazz en emisoras de difusión internacional y así poder mostrar la “superioridad” cultural de su país en detrimento de la otra superpotencia, la Unión Soviética. De este modo, la presente monografía tiene como fin estudiar de qué manera se instrumentalizó dicha estrategia como un medio para proyectar positivamente la imagen de los EEUU durante la Guerra Fría, concretamente entre 1954 y 1968, a partir de la teoría del realismo progresivo de Joseph Nye.

Works Councils: An Agency Perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in whichworks councils are supposed to monitor manager's information on behalf of the workforce,but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we considerthat workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In orderto deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they canbe expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusionmakes contingent payments costly and reduces workers' payoffs. Second, when elections areused to align works councils' interest only well compensated representatives would face aninter-temporal trade-off between accepting management's transfers at first period and losingrents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behaviour withmanagement and works councils will try to behave on the employees' interest.

Works councils: an agency perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in which works councils are supposed to monitor manager’s information on behalf of the workforce, but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we consider that workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In order to deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they can be expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusion makes contingent payments costly and reduces workers’ payoffs. Second, when elections are the exclusive mechanisms to align works councils’ interest, only well compensated representatives would face an intertemporal tradeoff between accepting management’s transfers at first period and losing rents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behavior with management and works councils will try to behave on the employees’ interest.