Desarrollo de un estado de la cuestión acerca de las interacciones entre el control de gestión y el aprendizaje organizacional.

Las organizaciones en la actualidad deben encontrar diferentes maneras de sobrevivir en un tiempo de rápida transformación. Uno de los mecanismos usados por las empresas para adaptarse a los cambios organizacionales son los sistemas de control de gestión, que a su vez permiten a las organizaciones hacer un seguimiento a sus procesos, para que la adaptabilidad sea efectiva. Otra variable importante para la adaptación es el aprendizaje organizacional siendo el proceso mediante el cual las organizaciones se adaptan a los cambios del entorno, tanto interno como externo de la compañía. Dado lo anterior, este proyecto se basa en la extracción de documentación soporte valido, que permita explorar las interacciones entre estos dos campos, los sistemas de control de gestión y el aprendizaje organizacional, además, analizar el impacto de estas interacciones en la perdurabilidad organizacional. ​

The politics of resource booms

This paper develops a simple model to investigate how resource-driven economic booms shape the equilibrium political institutions of resource-rich societies and influence the likelihood of experiencing civil war. In our model a strong government apparatus favors property rights protection but also makes the state more powerful and hence may induce predatory autocratic regimes over democracy. We characterize the parameter space of each political outcome in terms of the type of the available natural resources. Economic booms based on resources that are privately exploited empower the citizens and tend to ease democratic transitions. In contrast, booms based on resources exploited by the state tend to favor more dictatorial regimes. Finally, economic booms based on resources that can be exploited either by the state or by private citizens incite preemptive actions by both parties that may result in civil war. We discuss the predictions of the model using historical and contemporary examples.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.