The effect of Ponzi schemes on crime: Evidence from the colombian case

This paper estimates the impact of a massive negative income shock led by the simultaneous crash down of several Ponzi schemes (also known as financial ``pyramids"") in Colombia on crime rates at the municipal level. Using novel data on the spatial incidence of the latest wave of Colombian pyramids and their crash down date, I estimate difference-in-differences models with both monthly and yearly frequency. I find that the negative income shock of the pyramids" crash down differentially exacerbates crime in affected municipalities compared to those with no presence of Ponzi schemes. This is true for minor offenses like commercial theft or residential burglary, but not for major crimes as murder or terrorism.

Crisis of political representation and democratization in Mexico: the generality and specificity of the case

This article attempts to assess the implications and the own character of the crisis of representation in Mexico. Once the topic framed and the long-term dynamics of Mexican political elites presented, this paper will attempt to understand why, despite the pluralization of the party system, there remain many questions about the truly democratic nature of the Mexican political system.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

Economic shocks and crime: evidence from the crash of ponzi schemes

In November 2008, Colombian authorities dismantled a network of Ponzi schemes, making hundreds of thousands of investors lose tens of millions of dollars throughout the country. Using original data on the geographical incidence of the Ponzi schemes, this paper estimates the impact of their break down on crime. We find that the crash of Ponzi schemes differentially exacerbated crime in affected districts. Confirming the intuition of the standard economic model of crime, this effect is only present in places with relatively weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and with little access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as microcredit. In addition, we show that, with the exception of economically-motivated felonies such as robbery, violent crime is not affected by the negative shock.