Cambios en el régimen de pensiones en Colombia y su efecto en el margen intensivo de la oferta laboral

En Colombia, como en muchos países de América Latina, en los años 80 y 90 se hicieron cambios importantes en los regímenes de pensiones. Este trabajo hace un análisis de uno de esos cambios en Colombia. El cambio consistió en aumentar el tiempo de cotización necesario para reclamar los beneficios pensionales y la inclusión del salario dentro de la fórmula del monto de pensiones. Para este propósito se estudia el impacto sobre la oferta laboral de un cambio exógeno en estas condiciones usando un diseño de regresión discontinua. Se encuentra un efecto positivo sobre las horas promedio trabajadas en la semana.

Parametric pension reform and the intensive margin of labor supply, evidence from Colombia

We analyze the effect of a parametric reform of the fully-funded pension regime in Colombia on the intensive margin of the labor supply. We take advantage of a threshold defined by law in order to identify the causal effect using a regression discontinuity design. We find that a pension system that increases retirement age and the minimum weeks during which workers must contribute to claim pension benefits causes an increase of around 2 hours on the number of weekly worked hours; this corresponds to 4% of the average number of weekly worked hours or around 14% of a standard deviation of weekly worked hours. The effect is robust to different specifications, polynomial orders and sample sizes.

Do more decentralized local governments do better? an evaluation of the 2001 decentralization reform in Colombia

In this paper I evaluate the impact of the 2001 decentralization reform in Colombia. I use data from Colombia's municipalities. I look at the effect of the 2001 reform on enrolment in pre-college schools. While all municipalities received earnmarked national transfers, withthe reform some of then now have more responsabilities to provide education (deeper decen-tralization) than others. Particulary important, the reform entitle the more decentralizedmunicipalities to sign subsidy contracts with private school. Departments (the regional gov-ernments) are entitle to sign this type of contracts for the less decentralized municipalities.Since the rule for municipalities to receive more responsabilities follows and exogenous popu-lation threshold, I can implement Regression Discontinuity Design. Enrolment is measuredthrough two variables: the number of students enroled in public schools and the number of subsidized students enroled in private schools. Results sugest that more decentralized mu-nicipalities subsidize more students in private schools. The difference is significant at all thelevels of pre-college school for the period 2004-2006. In 2005, the difference accounts for20% of enrolment in private schools and 3% of population of school age. Besides, there are not significant differences among municipalities regarding enrolment in public schools.

Congress composition and electoral advantage

In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.