Beyond divide and rule : weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.

Natural resources, redistribution and Human capital formation

How do resource booms affect human capital accumulation? We exploit time and spatial variation generated by the commodity boom across local governments in Peru to measure the effect of natural resources on human capital formation. We explore the effect of both mining production and tax revenues on test scores, finding a substantial and statistically significant effect for the latter. Transfers to local governments from mining tax revenues are linked to an increase in math test scores of around 0.23 standard deviations. We find that the hiring of permanent teachers as well as the increases in parental employment and improvements in health outcomes of adults and children are plausible mechanisms for such large effect on learning. These findings suggest that redistributive policies could facilitate the accumulation of human capital in resource abundant developing countries as a way to avoid the natural resources curse.

Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.

Corporate human rights obligations and international investment law

La globalización permeó las fronteras artificiales existentes entre la economía y la sociedad alrededor del mundo. Las actividades empresariales en este ambiente globalizado ha servido como catalizador de las violaciones de derechos humanos como consecuencia de la ausencia de la protección institucional algunas empresas han explotado los vacíos jurídicos y la falta de protección de los derechos humanos. Al respecto, para lograr un cambio paradigmático requiere un fuerte énfasis en los derechos y las obligaciones de las empresas. Este artículo presenta un análisis crítico de las obligaciones de las empresas en material de derechos humanos frente a la falta de cláusulas de estabilización en los contratos de inversión extranjera. En primer lugar, estas cláusulas son examinadas en relación con la responsabilidad en las obligaciones corporativas con relación a los derechos humanos fundamentales. De acuerdo con lo anterior, se analizan las dimensiones sustantivas y procesales de las cláusulas de estabilización. En segundo lugar, apelando a los ejemplos concretos del Acuerdo para el desarrollo de la Minería entre Mittal Steel y el Gobierno de Liberia, así como el proyecto del Oleoducto de Baku‐Tblisi‐Ceyhan como casos de análisis, este artículo busca la aplicación de las cláusulas de estabilidad en las inversiones extranjeras con relación a la protección de los derechos humanos por parte de los Estados y de las empresas. En tercer lugar, se propone una modificación a la forma como se introduce la cláusula relativa a los derechos humanos. En este orden de ideas, los derechos humanos de los inversionistas, específicamente de las empresas, deben ser incluidos en los acuerdos de inversión extranjera.

First victims then perpetrators: child soldiers and International La

Este artículo examina la cuestión de los niños soldados en el Derecho Internacional. Después de haber hecho algunas observaciones preliminares sobre el enfoque del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos y del derecho humanitario sobre la protección de los derechos de los niños que se encuentren en un conflicto armado, el artículo revisa la prohibición del reclutamiento de los menores y la responsabilidad penal personal de los que los reclutan. También, será analizada la jurisprudencia sobre el reclutamiento de los niños. En la cuarta parte del artículo, se dará cuenta de la hipótesis de los menores autores de crímenes internacionales y se considerarán los enfoques de la justicia retributiva y de la justicia restaurativa