Beyond divide and rule : weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.

International propagation of shocks: an evaluation of contagion effects for some Latin American countries

In this paper we analyze the spread of shocks across assets markets in eight Latin American countries. First, we measure the extent of markets reactions with the Principal Components Analysis. And second, we investigate the volatility of assets markets based in ARCH-GARCH models in function of the principal components retained in the first stage. Our results do not support the existence of financial contagion, but of interdependence in most of the cases and a slight increase in the sensibility of markets to recent shocks.