A Strategic-Equilibrium Based

The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form, a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all players.  This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the stronger player paradox.  A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game.    [298-words]

An artificial economy based on reinforcement learning and agent based modeling

In this paper, we employ techniques from artificial intelligence such as reinforcement learning and agent based modeling as building blocks of a computational model for an economy based on conventions. First we model the interaction among firms in the private sector. These firms behave in an information environment based on conventions, meaning that a firm is likely to behave as its neighbors if it observes that their actions lead to a good pay off. On the other hand, we propose the use of reinforcement learning as a computational model for the role of the government in the economy, as the agent that determines the fiscal policy, and whose objective is to maximize the growth of the economy. We present the implementation of a simulator of the proposed model based on SWARM, that employs the SARSA(λ) algorithm combined with a multilayer perceptron as the function approximation for the action value function.

Is there a motherhood penalty? decomposing the family wage gap in Colombia

The aim of this paper is to provide an estimation and decomposition of the motherhood wage penalty in Colombia. Our empirical strategy was based on the matching procedure designed by Ñopo (The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2), 290–299, 2008a ) for the case of gender wage gaps. This is an alternative procedure to the well-known Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition method. Using the cross-sectional data of the Colombian Living Standard Survey, the wage gap was decomposed into four components, according to the characteristics of mothers and non-mothers. Three of the components are explained by differences in observable characteristics of women, while the other is the unexplained part of the gap. We found that mothers earn, on average, 1.73 % less than their counterparts without children and that this gap slightly decreased when the group included older women. It is observed from the results that, once schooling was included as a matching variable, the unexplained part of the gap considerably decreased and became non-significant. Thus, we did not find evidence of wage discrimination against mothers in the Colombian labor market. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013