Démocratie représentative et démocratie participative. Remarques pour une comparaison de la Colombie et du Venezuela contemporains

Sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, cet article cherche a démontrer le caractère dual de la démocratie participative en commençant, sur le plan théorique, par présenter quelques traits distincts et significatifs des différences entre ce qui est censé appartenir en propre à la démocratie représentative et ce qui est censé relever de la démocratie participative ; et dans un deuxième temps en abordant les correspondants pratiques de ces traits au Venezuela et en Colombie.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.