Exercise and Training at Altitudes: Physiological Effects and Protocols

An increase in altitude leads to a proportional fall in the barometric pressure, and a decrease in atmospheric oxygen pressure, producing hypobaric hypoxia that affects, in different degrees, all body organs, systems and functions. The chronically reduced partial pressure of oxygen causes that individuals adapt and adjust to physiological stress. These adaptations are modulated by many factors, including the degree of hypoxia related to altitude, time of exposure, exercise intensity and individual conditions. It has been established that exposure to high altitude is an environmental stressor that elicits a response that contributes to many adjustments and adaptations that influence exercise capacity and endurance performance. These adaptations include in crease in hemoglobin concentration, ventilation, capillary density and tissue myoglobin concentration. However, a negative effect in strength and power is related to a decrease in muscle fiber size and body mass due to the decrease in the training intensity. Many researches aim at establishing how training or living at high altitudes affects performance in athletes. Training methods, such as living in high altitudes training low, and training high-living in low altitudes have been used to research the changes in the physical condition in athletes and how the physiological adaptations to hypoxia can enhanceperformance at sea level. This review analyzes the literature related to altitude training focused on how physiological adaptations to hypoxic environments influence performance, and which protocols are most frequently used to train in high altitudes.

Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.