Armed conflict and paramilitary groups in Chiapas

The armed conflict in Chiapas began in 1994 after the armed uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). Until now the Mexican government do not recognize the existence of an armed conflict there, for what they call inter-ethnic violence that happens in different municipalities in Chiapas. This study aims at demonstrating that, first, the Mexican state of Chiapas has an armed conflict since the mid-nineties, which has intensified and transformed over sixteen years. It is in this transformation that have emerged paramilitary groups seeking to destabilize the state, generating dynamics of appropriation and control of territory through different practices such as forced displacements, selective assassinations and terror spread within populations who are the targets of their attacks (mainly community support of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation). This work studied the "Peace and Justice" paramilitary group operating in different parts of the state of Chiapas, mainly in the Northern Zone. This case-study will look at the changes it has undergone Mexican democracy, which will be analyzed at two points: first, the failure of federal and Chiapas state to allow or endorse the creation of paramilitary groups and not to punish their actions; on the other, the consequences of the actions of such actors in democratic institutions, and democracy itself. Will seek to demonstrate that indeed both the permissiveness of the Mexican state and its complicity has weakened democracy in Mexico, since they are not able to manage conflict so that they do not degenerate into violence.

Los grupos paramilitares en Bogotá y Cundinamarca, 1997-2005

Este artículo considera el período comprendido entre la segunda mitad de los 90, cuando aparecieron “grupos paramilitares” en Cundinamarca y Bogotá, y mediados de la primera década de este siglo, cuando fueron desmanteladas algunas de estas estructuras por parte de las autoridades, hubo entrega de armas por otras y surgieron organizaciones paramilitares “sustitutas” que permanecen activas en el ámbito territorial referido en este estudio. Destaca la actividad “antiinsurgente” desarrollada por los paramilitares en zonas coincidentes con aquellas donde las Fuerzas Militares adelantaron operaciones contrainsurgentes. Además, documenta el proceso de transformación y desintegración que sufrieron en el centro del país algunas estructuras paramilitares que acogieron el proceso de diálogo con el gobierno Uribe como parte de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia –AUC–a la vez que enfrentaban una “guerra interna” con otros grupos paramilitares recalcitrantes a participar del acuerdo. Finalmente presenta una apreciación sobre la evolución futura de los “ejércitos privados” que perviven luego de culminado el desarme de las AUC.-----This article surveys the period that covers the second half of the 1990’s, when “paramilitary groups” became visible in Cundinamarca and Bogotá, and the first half of the present decade, when a number of these structures were diminished as a result of law enforcement operations, a few others engaged in disarmament and new “substitute” paramilitary outfits emerged in the area referred by this study. It highlights the “anti-insurgent” activity of the paramilitary in areas that overlap with those where regular military forces carried out counterinsurgent operations. It also references the process of transformation and disintegration of paramilitary units in central Colombia that joined peace talks with the Uribe administration as part of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia –AUC–, as they simultaneously engaged in an “internal war” with other paramilitary groups reluctant to the agreement. It concludes with an appreciation about the future evolution of those “private armies” which endure after the AUC disarmament.

The Proliferation of Paramilitary Groups in Southern Mexico: State Strategy or Struggle between Local Political Elites?

This study traces the origins of Mexican paramilitary groups and argues that, contrary to what most of the literature on the subject implies, they do not represent a state strategy to thwart leftist groups seeking social change. Rather, they represent battles between groups of national and local-level elites with different visions of democracy and of what constitutes good governance. The polarization inherent in this type of conflict leads local actors to have to side with one faction of elites or the other. The presence of radical leftist groups in recently colonized indigenous areas with scant state presence gives rise to a process of radicalization among local elites. There are multiple factors that explain the emergence of paramilitary groups. Aside from the post Cold War international context, there were national factors like a shift in its focus away from security matters between 1989 and 1993, and presidential policies between 1968 and 1993, that planted the seeds of leftist radicalism in a context of id modernization

Los grupos paramilitares en Colombia: el incierto tránsito de la guerra a la paz

Esta investigación aborda las condiciones bajo las que se llevó a cabo en Colombia, en el primer gobierno del presidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2006), la negociación entre el Estado y los grupos paramilitares. Se establecen las características de ese proceso de paz, su correspondencia con modelos tradicionales de negociación y sus alcances sobre el proceso de Desmovilización, Desarme y Reinserción (DDR) de las organizaciones paramilitares.

The environmental impact of civil conflict : the deforestation effect of paramilitary expansion in Colombia

Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urab´a, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation.