Análisis al Proceso de Titulación Minera en Colombia desde TOC (Theory Of Constraints)

El incumplimiento reiterado de la normatividad y políticas relacionadas con los tiempos de respuesta del proceso de contratación minera del país, desarrollado actualmente por la recién creada Agencia Nacional de Minería ANM, ha suscitado que la administración del recurso minero no se realice bajo los principios de eficiencia, eficacia, economía y celeridad. Estas debilidades manifiestas provocan represamientos en la resolución de trámites, congelación de áreas para contratar, sobrecostos, demoras en los tiempos de respuesta establecidos por la normatividad vigente y trae como consecuencia incertidumbre en los inversionistas mineros y pérdidas por concepto de recaudo de canon superficiario, entre otras. El objetivo del presente trabajo de investigación consiste en analizar el proceso de titulación minera de Colombia a partir de la filosofía de mejora continua desarrollado en la teoría de restricciones TOC (Theory Of Constraints), para poder identificar cuáles son los cuellos de botella que no permiten que el proceso fluya de manera adecuada y proponer alternativas de mejora, que con su implementación exploten y subordinen la limitaciones al sistema.

Allocation rules on networks

When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source to the agent. Given the supplies at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens. We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on consistent and resource monotonic rules in claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles and we extend fairness principles to allocation rules on networks. We require that for each pair of citizens in the network, the extension is robust with respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust with respect to the fairness principle. We give applications of the algorithm for three fairness principles: egalitarianism, proportionality and equal sacrifice.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Dynamic programming for stochastic target problems, Viscosity solutions and hedging in markets with Portfolio constraints and large investors

The purpose of this expository arti le is to present a self- ontained overview of some results on the hara terization of the optimal value fun tion of a sto hasti target problem as (dis ontinuous) vis osity solution of a ertain dynami programming PDE and its appli ation to the problem of hedging ontingent laims in the presen e of portfolio onstraints and large investors