2 resultados para PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENTS
em Universidad del Rosario, Colombia
Resumo:
Municipal solid waste issue has acquired a growing importance into urban management discussions, particularly in metropolitan areas. Although metropolitan regions were created for integrating public functions of common interest, it appears that the structures, in general, are limited to planning activities. In this context, the democratization process occurred in Brazil during 1980’s led to the strengthening of inter-municipal arrangements of voluntary cooperation, acquiring great expressiveness in metropolitan areas, responsible for 60% of waste generated in Brazil. However, despite the consortia emergence as an alternative management of metropolitan territory, its process of setting up and operation is not free of challenges and dilemmas. This paper starts with the hypothesis that inter-municipal consortia in metropolitan areas have high strength asymmetry and weak regional identity among municipalities, conditions that tend to create barriers to its concretization. In this context, this research aim to develop a comparative study of inter-municipal arrangements for solid waste management in the metropolitan areas of Curitiba (pr), Belo Horizonte (bh) and Salvador (ba), by identifying influence degree of regional identity and strength asymmetry in these arrangements. The multiple case study reveals an inverse proportionality relationship between regional identity and strength asymmetry among the municipalities, deeply influenced by political interinstitutional arrangement and the metropolitan area in which they are is inserted.
Resumo:
We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersídecision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance payments mechanism.