Visual processing of concentric sine-wave gratings in adolescents and adults

The aim of this study was to compare the contrast visual processing of concentric sinusoidal gratings stimuli between adolescents and adults. The study included 20 volunteers divided into two groups: 10 adolescents aged 13-19 years (M=16.5, SD=1.65) and 10 adults aged 20-26 years (M=21.8, SD=2.04). In order to measure the contrast sensitivity at spatial frequencies of 0.6, 2.5, 5 and 20 degrees of visual angle (cpd), it was used the psychophysical method of two alternative forced choice (2AFC). A One Way ANOVA performance showed a significant difference in the comparison between groups: F [(4, 237)=3.74, p<.05]. The post-hoc Tukey HSD showed a significant difference between the frequencies of 0.6 (p <.05) and 20 cpd (p<.05). Thus, the results showed that the visual perception behaves differently with regard to the sensory mechanisms that render the contrast towards adolescents and adults. These results are useful to better characterize and comprehend human vision development.

Option pricing in market models driven by telegraph processes with jumps

Esta tesis está dividida en dos partes: en la primera parte se presentan y estudian los procesos telegráficos, los procesos de Poisson con compensador telegráfico y los procesos telegráficos con saltos. El estudio presentado en esta primera parte incluye el cálculo de las distribuciones de cada proceso, las medias y varianzas, así como las funciones generadoras de momentos entre otras propiedades. Utilizando estas propiedades en la segunda parte se estudian los modelos de valoración de opciones basados en procesos telegráficos con saltos. En esta parte se da una descripción de cómo calcular las medidas neutrales al riesgo, se encuentra la condición de no arbitraje en este tipo de modelos y por último se calcula el precio de las opciones Europeas de compra y venta.

Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.