On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Análisis del ciclo económico en una economía con rigideces nominales y un amplio sector informal

En este trabajo se construye un modelo de Equilibrio General Dinámico Estocástico (DSGE) con sector informal y rigideces en precios, usando como marco de análisis la teoría de búsqueda y emparejamiento del mercado de trabajo. El objetivo principal es analizar el efecto de los diferentes tipos de choques económicos sobre las principales variables del mercado laboral, en una economía con presencia importante del sector informal. Igualmente se estudia el efecto de la política monetaria, ya que la presencia de este sector afecta la dinámica del ciclo económico, y por ende los mecanismos de transmisión de la política monetaria. En particular, se analiza la dinámica del modelo bajo diferentes reglas de política monetaria y se compara el bienestar agente representativo generado por cada una de estas reglas.

The design of optimal education policies when individuals differ in inherited wealth and ability

In this paper I consider the role of education poli-cies in redistribution of income when individuals differ in two aspects: ability and inherited wealth. I discuss the extent to which the rules that emerge in unidimensional settings apply also in the bidimen-sional setting considered in this paper. The main conclusion is that, subject to some qualifi cations, the same type of rules that determine optimal education policies when only ability heterogeneity is considered apply to the case where both parameters of heterogeneity are considered. The qualifi cations pertain to the implementation of the optimal alloca-tion of resources to education and not the way the optimal allocations fi rst- and second-best differ.