A Network model of systemic risk : identifying the sources of dependence across institutions

We design a financial network model that explicitly incorporates linkages across institutions through a direct contagion channel, as well as an indirect common exposure channel. In particular, common exposure is setup so as to link the financial to the real sector. The model is calibrated to balance sheet data on the colombian financial sector. Results indicate that commercial banks are the most systemically important financial institutions in the system. Whereas government owned institutions are the most vulnerable institutions in the system.

Los conceptos de salud financiera, riesgo y epidemiología en los estados financieros de las compañías del sector de extracción de petróleo crudo y gas natural en Colombia

El presente proyecto tiene como objeto identificar cuáles son los conceptos de salud, enfermedad, epidemiología y riesgo aplicables a las empresas del sector de extracción de petróleo y gas natural en Colombia. Dado, el bajo nivel de predicción de los análisis financieros tradicionales y su insuficiencia, en términos de inversión y toma de decisiones a largo plazo, además de no considerar variables como el riesgo y las expectativas de futuro, surge la necesidad de abordar diferentes perspectivas y modelos integradores. Esta apreciación es pertinente dentro del sector de extracción de petróleo y gas natural, debido a la creciente inversión extranjera que ha reportado, US$2.862 millones en el 2010, cifra mayor a diez veces su valor en el año 2003. Así pues, se podrían desarrollar modelos multi-dimensional, con base en los conceptos de salud financiera, epidemiológicos y estadísticos. El termino de salud y su adopción en el sector empresarial, resulta útil y mantiene una coherencia conceptual, evidenciando una presencia de diferentes subsistemas o factores interactuantes e interconectados. Es necesario mencionar también, que un modelo multidimensional (multi-stage) debe tener en cuenta el riesgo y el análisis epidemiológico ha demostrado ser útil al momento de determinarlo e integrarlo en el sistema junto a otros conceptos, como la razón de riesgo y riesgo relativo. Esto se analizará mediante un estudio teórico-conceptual, que complementa un estudio previo, para contribuir al proyecto de finanzas corporativas de la línea de investigación en Gerencia.

De lo micro a lo macro prudencial: Un análisis de la supervisión bancaria desde la econometría espacial

La crisis que se desató en el mercado hipotecario en Estados Unidos en 2008 y que logró propagarse a lo largo de todo sistema financiero, dejó en evidencia el nivel de interconexión que actualmente existe entre las entidades del sector y sus relaciones con el sector productivo, dejando en evidencia la necesidad de identificar y caracterizar el riesgo sistémico inherente al sistema, para que de esta forma las entidades reguladoras busquen una estabilidad tanto individual, como del sistema en general. El presente documento muestra, a través de un modelo que combina el poder informativo de las redes y su adecuación a un modelo espacial auto regresivo (tipo panel), la importancia de incorporar al enfoque micro-prudencial (propuesto en Basilea II), una variable que capture el efecto de estar conectado con otras entidades, realizando así un análisis macro-prudencial (propuesto en Basilea III).

The Bogota – sabana region : the political economy behind the struggle to implement a sustainable urban development model

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Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare

We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care quality and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations). Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different objective i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante providers’ horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers.

Network externalities across financial institutions

We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.