Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

Estudio Costo-Efectividad de Lidocaína tópica como adyuvante a Pregabalina y Gabapentina en dolor neuropático periférico en una I.P.S de Bogotá 2011.

Introducción: el dolor neuropático es una patología de considerable prevalencia e impacto socio-económico en la población latinoamericana, la evidencia clínica sugiere que los ligandos de canales de calcio y el parche de Lidocaína pueden tratar exitosamente el dolor neuropático periférico y localizado. Metodología: se realizo una evaluación económica tipo costo-efectividad, observacional y retrospectiva con datos extraídos de las historias clínicas de pacientes atendidos en la clínica de dolor de la IPS. La variable primaria de efectividad fue la mejoría del dolor medida mediante escala visual análoga. Resultados: se estudiaron 94 pacientes tratados con: Gabapentina (G) 21, Pregabalina (P) 24, Gabapentina+ lidocaína (G/P) 24, Pregabalina + Lidocaína (P/L) 25, los costos asociados al tratamiento son los siguientes COP$114.070.835, COP$105.855.920, COP$88.717.481 COP$89.854.712 respectivamente, el número de pacientes con mejoría significativa de dolor fue: 8,10,9 y 21 pacientes respectivamente. El ICER de G/L con respecto a G fue: COP$ -25.353.354. El ICER de P/L con respecto a P fue: COP$ -1.454.655. Conclusiones: la adición del parche de lidocaína a la terapia regular con P/L represento una disminución de consumo de recursos en salud como uso de medicamentos co-analgésicos, analgésicos de rescate y fármacos para controlar reacciones adversas, de la misma forma que consultas a profesionales de la salud. Cada paciente manejado con P/L representa un ahorro de COP $1.454.655 al contrario si se manejase con el anticonvulsivante de manera exclusiva, en el caso de G/L este ahorro es de COP $ 25.353.354 frente a G sola.

Determinants of demand for antenatal care in Colombia

Even though antenatal care is universally regarded as important, determinants of demand for antenatal care have not been widely studied. Evidence concerning which and how socioeconomic conditions influence whether a pregnant woman attends or not at least one antenatal consultation or how these factors affect the absences to antenatal consultations is very limited. In order to generate this evidence, a two-stage analysis was performed with data from the Demographic and Health Survey carried out by Profamilia in Colombia during 2005. The first stage was run as a logit model showing the marginal effects on the probability of attending the first visit and an ordinary least squares model was performed for the second stage. It was found that mothers living in the pacific region as well as young mothers seem to have a lower probability of attending the first visit but these factors are not related to the number of absences to antenatal consultation once the first visit has been achieved. The effect of health insurance was surprising because of the differing effects that the health insurers showed. Some familiar and personal conditions such as willingness to have the last children and number of previous children, demonstrated to be important in the determination of demand. The effect of mother’s educational attainment was proved as important whereas the father’s educational achievement was not. This paper provides some elements for policy making in order to increase the demand inducement of antenatal care, as well as stimulating research on demand for specific issues on health.

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable

Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare

We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care quality and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations). Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different objective i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante providers’ horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers.