3 resultados para Mills and mill-work -- Catalonia -- S. IX
em Universidad del Rosario, Colombia
Resumo:
From the example of the process of general induction into the organization and using certain sociological resources, shows paradox are specialists in human management: is to carefor the motivation and the welfare of workers to achieve its high performance, their fidelity and his tenure at the company; However, current mutations of the social architecture in general and of work in particular –as structure of organized action– force thinking that organizational loyalty tends to be increasingly unlikely and that, conversely, the current personnel administration processes appear made inappropriate notions and appear to contribute directly to the adversities of human beings in organizational settings.
Resumo:
We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.
Resumo:
La configuración de lugares como áreas de protección ambiental puede ser vista como un proceso técnico y objetivo, en el que se crean políticas públicas que definen prácticas adecuadas e inadecuadas en el lugar. Pero esta configuración es un proceso histórico y negociado. Este se construye en contante diálogo entre diferentes actores que se preocupan por definir qué es la naturaleza y el cuidado ambiental, y las percepciones que individuos que habitan en o cerca a estos lugares construyen en su diario vivir. Es as como la configuración socioambiental de lugares como áreas de protección ocurre por transformaciones en la forma de percibir un lugar, la relaciones con este y sobre todo, prácticas y relaciones que se traducen en formas de negociar nociones de naturaleza y cuidado ambiental. Esta negociación tiene grandes implicaciones en los individuos, particularmente en su subjetividad. Es decir, en hechos como la forma de nombrarlo, caminarlo, observar las especies, iniciar proyectos de agricultura orgánica, cambiar prácticas productivas, el cerramiento de zonas para proteger las fuentes de agua o zonas de vegetación. También sobre su subjetividad, la manera como se sienten frente al lugar, como juzgan sus acciones y las de otros y cómo construyen objetivos personales con respecto a la idea de cuidado ambiental.