The influence of culture on parental styles in social vulnerability contexts

The objectives of this study are: (a) to analyze if the relationship between parenting dimensions and children adjustment regarding coping strategies are similar in Argentinian and Spanish samples within poverty contexts; (b) to compare parental dimensions in the two groups studied, and (c) to determine the efficiency of parenting through the study of their influence in children coping strategies. The Graffar-Méndez Castellano Scale (Méndez-Castellano & Méndez, 1994), that brings a socioeconomic description of the population; an Argentinian Scale of Children Perception of Parental Relationships for 8 to 12 years of age (Richaud, 2007a), and the Argentine Questionnaire of Coping for children (Richaud, 2006) were administered to a sample of 458 Spanish and Argentinian children from 8 to 12 years old. Correlations were carried out to analyze the relationships between parenting dimensions and children coping strategies in both groups, and MANOVA, to study if there were different parental dimensions in the two groups —Argentina and Spain—, and to analyze if there were differences in children coping strategies. The results indicate that correlational pattern is similar in both groups, but parental dimensions are different for each culture, being the Argentinian parents more neglectful than Spanish parents. At the same time, Argentinian children adopt coping strategies less efficient that the Spanish children ones, involving in that way a greater emotional conflict.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.