Development and/or change of the notion of permanent object and operative causality: empirical evidence in the first year of life

This study examines the notion of permanent object during the first year of life, taking into account the controversy of two approaches about the nature of change: developmental change and cognitive change. Using a longitudinal/cross-sectional design, tasks adapted of the subscale of permanent object and operative causality of the Uzgiris-Hunt Scale (Uzgiris and Hunt, 1975) (Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975) were presented to 110 infants of 0, 3, 6 and 9 months-old, which reside in three cities of Colombia. The results showed three types of strategies: (a) Not resolution; (b) Exploratory and (c) Resolution, which follow different trajectories in children’s performance. This allows affirming that adaptive conquests of the cognitive development stay together with the variety of strategies. Using strategies reveals adjustments and transformations of action programs that consolidate the notion of permanent object not necessarily with age, but with self-regulatory processes. Empirical evidence contributes to the understanding of the relations between the emergence of novelty in the development and performance variability

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.