2 resultados para Interaction analysis in education.
em Universidad del Rosario, Colombia
Resumo:
La historia del análisis del comportamiento en Brasil comenzó con la visita de Fred S. Keller a la Universidad de São Paulo en 1961, cuando él era un académico de la Fundación Fullbright; en aquella época, Keller presentó los trabajos de Skinner a los psicólogos brasileños. Su primer asistente fue Carolina Martuscelli Bori, en aquel entonces una psicóloga social influenciada por el trabajo de Kurt Lewin. Orientada inicialmente por Keller, Carolina Bori fue la principal fuerza de difusión del análisis del comportamiento en Brasil, comenzando con el curso de psicología en la Universidad de Brasilia, en el cual, durante agosto de 1964, se dictó el primer curso de Análisis Experimental de la Conducta. La mayoría de los analistas del comportamiento de hoy en día fueron directa o indirectamente estudiantes de Carolina Bori. Actualmente varios programas de psicología en el país ofrecen cursos de análisis del comportamiento
Resumo:
This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on ìpeer groupî e§ects. In the Örst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they Öx their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a§ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e§ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting of extreme di§erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then introduce a peer group e§ect which, for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signiÖcant impact on the results. The mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e§ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.