The Demobilization Process of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Between Politics and Justice

The phenomenon of paramilitarism in Colombia has received an ambiguous treatment, balancing between political and criminal issues; an oscillation that has been intimately linked to the evolution of the Colombian internal conflict. This contribution analyzes the recent negotiations held with paramilitary groups by the administration of Alvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010). After a brief account of the dependency path that has determined this historical episode, I propose an assessment of the use of judicial categories by the various actors of the negotiations. The main argument is that those categories –war criminal, political criminal, drug smuggler, etc.– do not depend on the intrinsic nature of an armed actor, but are socially constructed by a conflictive process of material and symbolic struggles. The capacity to categorize private violence, as legitimate or illegitimate, political or criminal, appears as one of the basic manifestations of the state’s action, as well as one of the main conflicts presiding at the rocess of state formation.

LA COOPERACIÓN BILATERAL EN MATERIA MILITAR ENTRE EE.UU. Y EGIPTO Y SU INCIDENCIA EN LA SEGURIDAD FRONTERIZA CON ISRAEL (2002-2008).

Este estudio de caso se realiza con el ánimo de analizar la cooperación militar existente entre Estados Unidos y Egipto durante el periodo de 2002 a 2008. De esta manera, se busca conocer la incidencia que dicha cooperación tuvo en la seguridad fronteriza de Egipto e Israel. Para tal fin a lo largo del trabajo se procederá a exponer los principales aspectos del programa de cooperación analizado, se identificaran las principales amenazas a la seguridad fronteriza de Egipto y de Israel y se describirán las principales acciones que en el marco de dicho programa de cooperación militar se han tomado para hacerles frente a estas.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.

Análisis de la actuación de la Autoridad Ejecutiva Temporal de las Naciones Unidas – (UNTEA) en la protección de los derechos políticos de los grupos vulnerables. Estudio de caso: Adhesión de Papúa Occidental a Indonesia (1962-1969)

Estudio de caso en el análisis de la situación afrontada por la población de Papúa Occidental durante el periodo de 1962-1969, época en la que la nueva República de Indonesia y Holanda se disputaban la soberanía sobre el territorio papuano. Dicha disputa tuvo lugar durante la época de Guerra Fría, lo que llevó a que Estados Unidos junto con sus aliados en la región y la Unión Soviética intervinieran en él. Finalmente, Estados Unidos teniendo en cuenta sus intereses favoreció a la República de Indonesia y obligó a Holanda firmar el Acuerdo de Nueva York, en el que se establecía que sería la Autoridad Ejecutiva Temporal de las Naciones Unidas quien administrara y preparara el territorio para un futuro Acto de Libre Elección. En cualquiera que fuese el panorama, las Naciones Unidas no cumplieron con lo establecido en el Acuerdo lo que llevó a que fueran condescendientes con todas las peticiones indonesias sin tener en cuenta los deseos y los derechos de la población papuana, violándose su derecho de auto-determinación de los pueblos.

Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

In this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.