Information provision in procurement auctions

We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante.

Delimitation of the Right to Life by Healthcare Professionals: Up to what point should the right to life be protected?

This article explores the medical care standard required by law for terminally illpatients and the possibility of limiting therapeutic efforts while respecting the duediligence expected from doctors. To this end, circumstances are identified in whichthe doctor is forced to choose between two possible actions: to guarantee the right tolife by continuing treatment, or to limit the right to healthcare by limiting therapeuticefforts. Two cases taken from English Common Law were reviewed that decided onthe factual problem at hand. In our country, the Constitutional Court established aline of jurisprudence on the role of the doctor in deciding whether or not to continuetreatment for a terminally ill person. Lastly, jurisprudence precedents are presentedalong with a comparative analysis of the solutions given in Great Britain andin Colombia.