Genomic architecture of adaptive color pattern divergence and convergence in Heliconius butterflies

Identifying the genetic changes driving adaptive variation in natural populations is key to understanding the origins of biodiversity. The mosaic of mimetic wing patterns in Heliconius butterflies makes an excellent system for exploring adaptive variation using next-generation sequencing. In this study, we use a combination of techniques to annotate the genomic interval modulating red color pattern variation, identify a narrow region responsible for adaptive divergence and convergence in Heliconius wing color patterns, and explore the evolutionary history of these adaptive alleles. We use whole genome resequencing from four hybrid zones between divergent color pattern races of Heliconius erato and two hybrid zones of the co-mimic Heliconius melpomene to examine genetic variation across 2.2 Mb of a partial reference sequence. In the intergenic region near optix, the gene previously shown to be responsible for the complex red pattern variation in Heliconius, population genetic analyses identify a shared 65-kb region of divergence that includes several sites perfectly associated with phenotype within each species. This region likely contains multiple cis-regulatory elements that control discrete expression domains of optix. The parallel signatures of genetic differentiation in H. erato and H. melpomene support a shared genetic architecture between the two distantly related co-mimics; however, phylogenetic analysis suggests mimetic patterns in each species evolved independently. Using a combination of next-generation sequencing analyses, we have refined our understanding of the genetic architecture of wing pattern variation in Heliconius and gained important insights into the evolution of novel adaptive phenotypes in natural populations.

Ownership structure and risk at Colombian banks

The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk.

Does Opaqueness Make Equity Capital Expensive for Banks?

Bank managers often claim that equity is expensive, which contradicts the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem. An opaque bank must signal its solvency by paying high and stable dividends in order to keep depositors tranquil. This signalling may require costly liquidations if the return on assets has been poor, but not paying the dividend might trigger a run. A strongly capitalized bank should keep substantial amounts of risk-free yet non-productive currency because the number of shares is high, which is costly. The dividend is informative of the state of the bank; rational depositors react to it.