School management and sexual behavior of teenagers

This paper asks whether school based management may help reducing risky sexual behavior of teenagers. For this purpose we use student level data from Bogot´a to identify students from Concession School (CS), who are enrolled in public education system with a more school management autonomy at school level, and to compare them with those students at the traditional public education system. We use propensity score matching methods to have a comparable sample between pupils at CS and traditional schools. Our results show that on average the behavior of students from CS do not have a sexual behavior that differs from those in traditional public schools except for boys in CS who have a lower probability of being sexual active. However, there are important differences when heterogeneity is considered. For example we find that CS where girls per boys ratio is higher have lower teenage pregnancy rates than public schools with also high girls per boys ratios. We also find that teachers’ human capital, teacher-pupil ratio or whether school offers sexual education are also related to statistically significant differences between CS and traditional public schools.

Civil conflict and voting behavior : evidence from Colombia

¿Cuáles son los efectos de la guerra sobre el comportamiento político? Colombia es un caso interesante en el que el conflicto y las elecciones coexisten y los grupos armados ilegales intencionalmente afectan los resultados electorales. Sin embargo, los grupos usan diferentes estrategias para alterar estos resultados. Este artículo argumenta que los efectos diferenciales de la violencia sobre los resultados electorales son el resultado de estrategias deliberadas de los grupos ilegales, que a su turno, son consecuencia de las condiciones militares que difieren entre ellos. Usando datos panel de las elecciones al Senado de 1994 a 2006 y una aproximación por variables instrumentales para resolver posibles problemas de endogenidad, este artículo muestra que la violencia guerrillera disminuye la participación electoral, mientras que la violencia paramilitar no tiene ningún efecto sobre la participación pero reduce la competencia electoral y beneficia a nuevos partidos no-tradicionales. Esto es consistente con la hipótesis de que la estrategia de la guerrilla es sabotear las elecciones, mientras que los paramiltares establecen alianzas con ciertos candidatos.

Social skills of children with different disabilities: Assessment and implications for interventions

This study characterizes the differences and similarities in the repertoire of social skills of children from 12 different categories of special educational needs: autism, hearing impairment, mild intellectual disabilities, moderate intellectual disabilities, visual impairment, phonological disorder, learning disabilities, giftedness and talent, externalizing behavior problems, internalizing behavior problems, internalizing and externalizing behavior problems and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Teachers of 120 students in regular and special schools, aged between 6 and 14 years old, from four Brazilian states, responded to the Social Skills Rating System. Children with ADHD, autism, internalizing and externalizing behavior problems and externalizing behavior problems presented comparatively lower frequency of social skills. The intervention needs of each evaluated category are discussed.

Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.

On blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study

The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question as to how to define kindness. In this paper we offer a new definition of kindness that we call “blame-freeness.” Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a social situation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i, while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames i” for his actions (i’s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and find significant support for the theory.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Parametric pension reform and the intensive margin of labor supply, evidence from Colombia

We analyze the effect of a parametric reform of the fully-funded pension regime in Colombia on the intensive margin of the labor supply. We take advantage of a threshold defined by law in order to identify the causal effect using a regression discontinuity design. We find that a pension system that increases retirement age and the minimum weeks during which workers must contribute to claim pension benefits causes an increase of around 2 hours on the number of weekly worked hours; this corresponds to 4% of the average number of weekly worked hours or around 14% of a standard deviation of weekly worked hours. The effect is robust to different specifications, polynomial orders and sample sizes.

The impact of a minimum pension on old age poverty and its budgetary cost. Evidence from Latin America

This paper examines the impact on old age poverty and the fiscal cost of universal minimum oldage pensions in Latin America using recent household survey data for 18 countries. Alleviatingold age poverty requires different approach from other age groups and a minimum pension islikely to be the only alternative available. First we measure old age poverty rates for all countries.Second we discuss the design of minimum pensions schemes, means-tested or not, as wellas the disincentive effects that they are expected to have on the economic and social behavior ofhouseholds including labor supply, saving and family solidarity. Third we use the household surveysto simulate the fiscal cost and the impact on poverty rates of alternative minimum pensionschemes in the 18 countries. We show that a universal minimum pension would substantiallyreduce poverty among the elderly except in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay where minimumpension systems already exist and poverty rates are low. Such schemes have much tobe commended in terms of incentives, spillover effects and administrative simplicity but have ahigh fiscal cost. The latter is a function of the age at which benefits are awarded, the prevailinglongevity, the generosity of benefits, the efficacy of means testing, and naturally the fiscal capacityof the country.

Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.