Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.

Identifying job skills in commercial advisors in a health insurance company

The aim of this research was to identify the criticalcompetence of success of the commercial adviserin a company providing insurance and health services.For this research a sample of 34 commercialadvisers. The sample was divided into four groups(two per product and two per criterion of success).Systematic fi eld observations, interviews of criticalincidents, application of response tests and salesworkshops were used to evaluate the differentialcompetences that the successful advisers wereshowing in relation to the advisers de fi ned as average.The success criteria were based on the generatedcommission performance over the 10 months. Allin all, signi fi cant differences were found betweenthe “successful” and “average” groups. Furthermore,competences that correlate positively with atop sales performance were observed and competencesthat have major level of discrimination betweenthe “successful” and “average” groups wereestablished. Orientation to achievement, planningand management, information search, commercialaggressiveness and strategic vision are the competencesthat were considered to be key in the topperformance of a sales agent or commercial adviser.Additionally, the results in the response testswere analyzed in the four study groups, withoutobserving signi fi cant differences between them,which supports the theoretical framework of thepresent study.

Learning how (not) to fire a gun: combatant training and civilian victimization

What is the relationship between the type of training combatants receive upon recruitment into an armed group and their propensity to abuse civilians in civil war? Does military training or political training prevent or exacerbate the victimization of civilians by armed non-state actors? While the literature on civilian victimization has expanded rapidly, few studies have examined the correlation between abuse of civilians and the modes of training that illegal armed actors receive. Using a simple formal model, we develop hypotheses regarding this connection and argue that while military training should not decrease the probability that a combatant engages in civilian abuse, political training should. We test these hypotheses using a new survey consisting of a representative sample of approximately 1,500 demobilized combatants from the Colombian conflict, which we match with department-level data on civilian casualties. The empirical analysis confirms our hypotheses about the connection between training and civilian abuse and the results are robust to adding a full set of controls both at the department and at the individual level

Unemployment insurance : severance payments and informality in developing countries

We analyze whether the introduction or an increase of unemployment insurance (UI hereafter) beneÖts in developing countries reduces the e§ort made by unemployed workers to secure a new job in the formal sector. We adopt a comparative static approach and we consider the consequences of an increase of current UI beneÖts on unemployed workersídecision variables in this same period, i.e. we focus on an intra-temporal trade-o§, allowing us to assume away moral hazard complications. When there is no informal sector, unemployed workers may devote their time between e§ort to secure a new job in the formal sector and leisure. In the presence of an informal sector, unemployed workers may also devote time to remunerated informal activities. Consequently, the amount of e§ort devoted to secure a new (formal) job generates an opportunity cost, which ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of time devoted to remunerated activities in the informal sector. We show that in the presence of an informal sector, an increase of current UI beneÖts decreases this marginal opportunity cost and therefore unambiguously increases the e§ort undertaken to secure a new job in the formal sector. This intra-temporal e§ect is the only one at play in presence of one-shot UI beneÖts or with severance payments mechanism.

Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector

We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI benefits, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits or long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed worker´s effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort.The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. We provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength. This result softens the widespread opinion, usually based on the microeconomic/partial equilibrium argument that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.

Financial protection for the poor in Colombia: the effects of a subsidized health insurance scheme

Financial protection is one of the objectives of health systems, which protects poor households from falling into poverty as a result of health care related expenses. Expanding prepayment schemes to the poor is difficult in developing countries because labor is largely informal. Providing health care free-at-point-of-service does not adequately target spending on the poorest, but occupation- or community-based schemes have also inherent limitations to achieve universal coverage. Colombia adopted a government-subsidized health insurance scheme (SHI) strategy. The political debate about increasing SHI enrollment needs evidence about the effectiveness of this scheme regarding financial protection. This study runs a four-part model to estimate the effect of SHI on out-of-pocket expenses by the poor that are currently uninsured, if they were enrolled in the SHI. The results show a 43% and 50% reduction in expenses at Bogotá and national level respectively, which confirms the effectiveness of SHI as a financial protection tool.

Health insurance as a strategy for access : Streamlined facts of the Colombian Health Care Reform

La reforma colombiana al sistema de salud (Ley 100 de 1993) estableció, como estrategia para facilitar el acceso, la universalidad de un seguro de salud que se adquiere mediante la cotización en el régimen contributivo o mediante la afiliación gratuita al régimen subsidiado, con la meta de cubrir a toda la población con un plan de beneficios único que comprende servicios de todos los niveles de atención. En el documento se analizan los principales hechos estilizados de la reforma en cuanto a cobertura del seguro y acceso y, mediante modelos logit, se estiman los determinantes de la afiliación y del acceso, con datos de las encuestas de calidad de vida de 1997 y 2003. Se destaca que la cobertura pasó del 20% de la población en 1993 al 60% en 2004, aunque parece imposible alcanzar la universalidad; la estructura y evolución de la cobertura muestran que los dos regímenes son complementarios, de modo que mientras el contributivo tiene mayor presencia en las ciudades y entre la población con empleo formal, el subsidiado tiene mayor peso entre la población rural y con bajos niveles de ingresos; por otra parte, el seguro tiene ventajas para la población subsidiada, con una mayor probabilidad de utilización de servicios, aunque el plan es inferior al del contributivo y existen barreras para el acceso.

Biased selection within the social health insurance market in Colombia

Las regulaciones como primaje comunitario, paquetes estandarizados y afiliación abierta, orientadas a reducir el impacto de las fallas en los mercados de seguros, tienen un efecto limitado puesto que abren espacio a la selección sesgada. A partir de 1993, el sistema de seguridad social en salud en Colombia fue reformado hacia un enfoque de mercado con la expectativa de mejorar el desempeño de los monopolios preexistentes exponiéndolos a la competencia de nuevos entrantes. La hipótesis que se maneja en el trabajo es que las fallas de mercado pueden llevar a selección sesgada favoreciendo a los nuevos entrantes. Se analizaron dos encuestas de hogares utilizando el estado de salud auto reportado y la presencia de enfermedad crónica como indicadores prospectivos del riesgo de los afiliados. Se encuentra que hay selección sesgada, llevando a selección adversa entre los aseguradores preexistentes, y a selección favorable entre los nuevos entrantes. Este patrón se observa en 1997 y se incrementa en el 2003. Aunque las entidades preexistentes son entidades públicas, y su tamaño disminuyó sustancialmente entre estos años, se analizan sus implicaciones fiscales en términos de financiación adicional por parte del gobierno.

Quantil Hedging for telegraph markets and its applications to a pricing of equity-linked life insurance contracts

En este documento está desarrollado un modelo de mercado financiero basado en movimientos aleatorios con tiempo continuo, con velocidades constantes alternantes y saltos cuando hay cambios en la velocidad. Si los saltos en la dirección tienen correspondencia con la dirección de la velocidad del comportamiento aleatorio subyacente, con respecto a la tasa de interés, el modelo no presenta arbitraje y es completo. Se construye en detalle las estrategias replicables para opciones, y se obtiene una presentación cerrada para el precio de las opciones. Las estrategias de cubrimiento quantile para opciones son construidas. Esta metodología es aplicada al control de riesgo y fijación de precios de instrumentos de seguros.