Determinantes de la deserción universitaria en la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad del Rosario

Este trabajo analiza el problema de la deserción estudiantil en la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad del Rosario, a través del estudio de los factores individuales, académicos y socioeconómicos que implican el riesgo de desertar. Con este objetivo, se utiliza el análisis de modelos de duración. Específi camente, se estima un modelo de riesgo proporcional de tiempo discreto con y sin heterogeneidad observada (Prentice- Gloeckler, 1978 y Meyer, 1980). Los resultados muestran que los estudiantes de sexo masculino, la vinculación de los estudiantes al mercado laboral y los estudiantes provenientes de otras regiones, tienen el mayor riesgo de deserción. Además, la edad del estudiante incrementa el riesgo, sin embargo, su efecto decrece marginalmente al aumentar la edad. Palabras clave: deserción estudiantil, modelos de duración, riesgo proporcional. Clasifi cación JEL: C41, C13, I21.

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable