Armed conflict and paramilitary groups in Chiapas

The armed conflict in Chiapas began in 1994 after the armed uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). Until now the Mexican government do not recognize the existence of an armed conflict there, for what they call inter-ethnic violence that happens in different municipalities in Chiapas. This study aims at demonstrating that, first, the Mexican state of Chiapas has an armed conflict since the mid-nineties, which has intensified and transformed over sixteen years. It is in this transformation that have emerged paramilitary groups seeking to destabilize the state, generating dynamics of appropriation and control of territory through different practices such as forced displacements, selective assassinations and terror spread within populations who are the targets of their attacks (mainly community support of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation). This work studied the "Peace and Justice" paramilitary group operating in different parts of the state of Chiapas, mainly in the Northern Zone. This case-study will look at the changes it has undergone Mexican democracy, which will be analyzed at two points: first, the failure of federal and Chiapas state to allow or endorse the creation of paramilitary groups and not to punish their actions; on the other, the consequences of the actions of such actors in democratic institutions, and democracy itself. Will seek to demonstrate that indeed both the permissiveness of the Mexican state and its complicity has weakened democracy in Mexico, since they are not able to manage conflict so that they do not degenerate into violence.

Association of genetic variants in complement factor H and factor H-related genes with systemic lupus erythematosus susceptibility

Systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), a complex polygenic autoimmune disease, is associated with increased complement activation. Variants of genes encoding complement regulator factor H (CFH) and five CFH-related proteins (CFHR1-CFHR5) within the chromosome 1q32 locus linked to SLE, have been associated with multiple human diseases and may contribute to dysregulated complement activation predisposing to SLE. We assessed 60 SNPs covering the CFH-CFHRs region for association with SLE in 15,864 case-control subjects derived from four ethnic groups. Significant allelic associations with SLE were detected in European Americans (EA) and African Americans (AA), which could be attributed to an intronic CFH SNP (rs6677604, in intron 11, Pmeta = 6.6×10-8, OR = 1.18) and an intergenic SNP between CFHR1 and CFHR4 (rs16840639, Pmeta = 2.9×10-7, OR = 1.17) rather than to previously identified disease-associated CFH exonic SNPs, including I62V, Y402H, A474A, and D936E. In addition, allelic association of rs6677604 with SLE was subsequently confirmed in Asians (AS). Haplotype analysis revealed that the underlying causal variant, tagged by rs6677604 and rs16840639, was localized to a ~146 kb block extending from intron 9 of CFH to downstream of CFHR1. Within this block, the deletion of CFHR3 and CFHR1 (CFHR3-1Δ), a likely causal variant measured using multiplex ligation-dependent probe amplification, was tagged by rs6677604 in EA and AS and rs16840639 in AA, respectively. Deduced from genotypic associations of tag SNPs in EA, AA, and AS, homozygous deletion of CFHR3-1Δ (Pmeta = 3.2×10-7, OR = 1.47) conferred a higher risk of SLE than heterozygous deletion (Pmeta = 3.5×10-4, OR = 1.14). These results suggested that the CFHR3-1Δ deletion within the SLE-associated block, but not the previously described exonic SNPs of CFH, might contribute to the development of SLE in EA, AA, and AS, providing new insights into the role of complement regulators in the pathogenesis of SLE.

Beyond divide and rule : weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.