Labor supply, biased technological change and economic growth

Se utiliza un modelo de innovaciones sesgadas para estudiar los efectos de cambios exógenos en la oferta laboral. En un contexto de innovaciones sesgadas, a medida que las economías acumulan capital, el trabajo se hace relativamente más escaso y más caro, por este motivo, hay incentivos para adoptar tecnologías ahorradoras de trabajo. Del mismo modo un cambio en la oferta laboral afecta la abundancia de factores y sus precios relativos. En general, una reducción de la oferta laboral, hace que el trabajo sea más caro y genera incentivos para cambio tecnológico ahorrador de trabajo. Así, el efecto inicial que tiene el cambio en la oferta laboral sobre los precios de los factores es mitigado por el cambio tecnológico. Finalmente, los movimientos en la remuneración a los factores afectan las decisiones de ahorro y, por lo tanto, la dinámica del crecimiento. En este trabajo se exploran las consecuencias de una reducción de la oferta laboral en dos contextos teóricos diferentes: un modelo de agentes homogéneos y horizonte infinito y un modelo de generaciones traslapadas.

Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector

We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI benefits, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits or long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed worker´s effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort.The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. We provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength. This result softens the widespread opinion, usually based on the microeconomic/partial equilibrium argument that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.

Informality in the City: a Theoretical Analysis

This thesis theoretically studies the relationship between the informal sector (both in the labor and the housing market) and the city structure.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.