Equilibrium Principle in Colombian Public Contracting

Public contracting in Colombia is conflicting and inefficient. It frequently leads to damage to State property. The Colombian legal system cannot assure efficient and transparent public contracting. The cause is the institutional environment characterized by high transaction costs. Colombian law worsens the process by recognizing the principle of economic equilibrium in public contracts. This principle increasese contract incompleteness and renders impossible the use of economic incentives to control the opportunism of the economic agents. The authors present the hypothesis that the economic equilibrium principle increases the conflictive nature of public contracting. They test the hypothesis empirically. The first section of the paper presents a summary of the literature on transaction costs economics, as well as the legal literature on the historical origin and the content of the economic equilibrium principle. The second section describes the methodology of the empirical study. The third section shows the empirical evidence of the effects that the economic equilibrium principle exerts over the public contracting. The last section presents the conclusions.

Productivity growth in electric energy retail in Colombia. A bootstrapped malmquist indices approach

This paper offers a productivity growth estimate for electric energy commercialization firms in Colombia, using a non-parametric Malmquist bootstrap methodology. The estimation and methodology serve two main purposes. First, in Colombia Commercialization firms are subject to a price-cap regulation scheme, a non-common arrangement in the international experience for this part of the industry. Therefore the paper’s result suggest an estimate of the productivity factor to be used by the regulator, not only in Colombia but in other countries where commercialization is a growing part of the industry (renewable energy, for instance). Second, because of poor data collection from regulators and firms themselves, regulation based on a single estimation of productivity seems inappropriate and error-prone. The nonparametric Malmquist bootstrap estimation allows an assessment of the result in contrast to a single one estimation. This would open an opportunity for the regulator to adopt a narrower and more accurate productivity estimation or override an implausible result and impose a productivity factor in the price-cap to foster the development of the industry.