Vignettes and self-reported work disability in the United States: Correction of report heterogeneity

Subjective measures of health tend to suffer from bias given by reporting heterogeneity. however, some methodologies are used to correct the bias in order to compare self-assessed health for respondents with different sociodemographic characteristics. One of the methods to correct this is the hierarchical ordered probit (hopit), which includes rates of vignettes -hypothetical individuals with a fixed health state- and where two assumptions have to be fulfilled, vignette equivalence and response consistency. this methodology is used for the self-reported work disability for a sample of the united states for 2011. The results show that even though sociodemographic variables influence rating scales, adjusting for this does not change their effect on work disability, which is only influenced by income. the inclusion of variables related with ethnicity or place of birth does not influence the true work disability. however, when only one of them is excluded, it becomes significant and affects the true level of work disability as well as income.

Unemployment insurance in the presence of an informal sector

We study the effect of UI benefits in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI benefits, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI benefits or long-run unemployed without UI benefits. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI benefits affect unemployed worker´s effort to secure a formal job, their labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time. Our model reveals that an increase in UI benefits generates two opposing effects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search efforts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower effort. Second, it generates an income effect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases effort.The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two effects. Additionally, we show that an increase in UI benefits increases the efforts of long-run unemployed workers. We provide a simple simulation exercise which suggests that the income effect pointed out is not necessarily of second-order importance in comparison with moral hazard strength. This result softens the widespread opinion, usually based on the microeconomic/partial equilibrium argument that the presence of dual labor markets is an obstacle to providing UI in developing countries.

Regulatory governance in the latinamerican telecommunications sector

Empezando con Chile a comienzos de 1980, los países de América Latina han profundizado la reforma a las telecomunicaciones para crear un entorno regulatorio que incentive la inversión privada, en particular la inversión extranjera. En este artículo, trabajo las tendencias regulatorias en el sector telecomunicaciones de 24 países latinoamericanos y del caribe durante el período 1980-1997 y construyo un índice basado en : autonomía, rendición de cuentas, claridad de las funciones y objetivos, transparencia y participación, y el tipo de mandato legal que crea el ente regulador. El índice muestra que, en promedio, la mayoría de los países llevaron a cabo fuertes reformas regulatorias en la dirección sugerida por expertos e investigadores. El índice también se correlación bien con varias variables políticas, de riesgo, económicas y de telecomunicaciones.

Informality in the City: a Theoretical Analysis

This thesis theoretically studies the relationship between the informal sector (both in the labor and the housing market) and the city structure.