Political intervention in economic activity

This paper proposes a political economy explanation of bailouts to declining industries. A model of probabilistic voting is developed, in which two candidates compete for the vote of two groups of the society through tactical redistribution. We allow politicians to have core support groups they understand better, this implies politicians are more or less effective to deliver favors to some groups. This setting is suited to reproduce pork barrels or machine politics and patronage. We use this model to illustrate the case of an economy with both an efficient industry and a declining one, in which workers elect their government. We present the conditions under which the political process ends up with the lagged-behind industry being allowed to survive.

The international economic crisis and the colombian economy

The purpose of this research is to provide an approximation to the likely effects of the crisis on the Colombian economy and to the effectiveness of policy response. For this, the most relevant transmission channels and policy measures are simulated in the setting of a static computable general equilibrium model (CGE). The results obtained are interesting in their own right and are in line with what could be expected given the information available on the behavior of the Colombian economy. Furthermore, they call into question the effectiveness of governmental intervention as judged by its intended countercyclical effects.