Administrative authorization for the demolition of urban rental units pursuant to the law of 1964: a spanish example of problematic over-activity in the application of transitional laws

Transitional provisions are defined as the set of regulations that rule juridical relationships on the occasion of a legislative change. Out of this context of law succession, their indiscriminate application can lead to serious inconsistencies. The analysis of a Spanish private law example is offered to illustrate this fact. It concerns the administrative authorization for the demolition of rented buildings in the cities. A regulation repealed more than fifteen years ago and however widespread utilised on ancient constructions that, after recent urban development, have acquired great economic value; something that in the end explains the current importance of such provisions. What is happening in Spain: denaturalization of the original  figure due to a mixture of formalist interpretations and speculative market interests, is presented here to call the attention on the necessary limitation of transitional provisions’ effects.

Works Councils: An Agency Perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in whichworks councils are supposed to monitor manager's information on behalf of the workforce,but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we considerthat workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In orderto deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they canbe expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusionmakes contingent payments costly and reduces workers' payoffs. Second, when elections areused to align works councils' interest only well compensated representatives would face aninter-temporal trade-off between accepting management's transfers at first period and losingrents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behaviour withmanagement and works councils will try to behave on the employees' interest.

Works councils: an agency perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in which works councils are supposed to monitor manager’s information on behalf of the workforce, but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we consider that workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In order to deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they can be expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusion makes contingent payments costly and reduces workers’ payoffs. Second, when elections are the exclusive mechanisms to align works councils’ interest, only well compensated representatives would face an intertemporal tradeoff between accepting management’s transfers at first period and losing rents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behavior with management and works councils will try to behave on the employees’ interest.