A juridical-practical framework for the investigation of crimes against granting of public housing services

The public service enterprises are victims of crimes and felonies which may reduce their capacity to perform their functions. These enterprises expend much money and effort in order to prevent those criminal behaviors. For this reason they ask from the authorities more efficient measures against crime; however, such enterprises may feel that they are not being given sufficient importance and/or remedies in dealing with such crime. The aim paper of this is not to study the problem from de substantive criminal law point of view. Rather, this paper’s goal is to study the Colombia’s Rules of Criminal Procedure, which regulate the investigation of this kind of crime. The article will look particularly at the competency of the relevant authorities at the investigative stages. Finally, it will make some recommendations regarding a proper route towards the investigation of these criminal behaviors.

The crime kuznets curve

We document the existence of a Crime Kuznets Curve in US states since the 1970s. As income levels have risen, crime has followed an inverted U-shaped pattern, first increasing and then dropping. The Crime Kuznets Curve is not explained by income inequality. In fact, we show that during the sample period inequality has risen monotonically with income, ruling out the traditional Kuznets Curve. Our finding is robust to adding a large set of controls that are used in the literature to explain the incidence of crime, as well as to controlling for state and year fixed effects. The Curve is also revealed in nonparametric specifications. The Crime Kuznets Curve exists for property crime and for some categories of violent crime.

Economic shocks and crime: evidence from the crash of ponzi schemes

In November 2008, Colombian authorities dismantled a network of Ponzi schemes, making hundreds of thousands of investors lose tens of millions of dollars throughout the country. Using original data on the geographical incidence of the Ponzi schemes, this paper estimates the impact of their break down on crime. We find that the crash of Ponzi schemes differentially exacerbated crime in affected districts. Confirming the intuition of the standard economic model of crime, this effect is only present in places with relatively weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and with little access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as microcredit. In addition, we show that, with the exception of economically-motivated felonies such as robbery, violent crime is not affected by the negative shock.