Análisis al Proceso de Titulación Minera en Colombia desde TOC (Theory Of Constraints)

El incumplimiento reiterado de la normatividad y políticas relacionadas con los tiempos de respuesta del proceso de contratación minera del país, desarrollado actualmente por la recién creada Agencia Nacional de Minería ANM, ha suscitado que la administración del recurso minero no se realice bajo los principios de eficiencia, eficacia, economía y celeridad. Estas debilidades manifiestas provocan represamientos en la resolución de trámites, congelación de áreas para contratar, sobrecostos, demoras en los tiempos de respuesta establecidos por la normatividad vigente y trae como consecuencia incertidumbre en los inversionistas mineros y pérdidas por concepto de recaudo de canon superficiario, entre otras. El objetivo del presente trabajo de investigación consiste en analizar el proceso de titulación minera de Colombia a partir de la filosofía de mejora continua desarrollado en la teoría de restricciones TOC (Theory Of Constraints), para poder identificar cuáles son los cuellos de botella que no permiten que el proceso fluya de manera adecuada y proponer alternativas de mejora, que con su implementación exploten y subordinen la limitaciones al sistema.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach

We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.

Dynamic programming for stochastic target problems, Viscosity solutions and hedging in markets with Portfolio constraints and large investors

The purpose of this expository arti le is to present a self- ontained overview of some results on the hara terization of the optimal value fun tion of a sto hasti target problem as (dis ontinuous) vis osity solution of a ertain dynami programming PDE and its appli ation to the problem of hedging ontingent laims in the presen e of portfolio onstraints and large investors