Natural resources, redistribution and Human capital formation

How do resource booms affect human capital accumulation? We exploit time and spatial variation generated by the commodity boom across local governments in Peru to measure the effect of natural resources on human capital formation. We explore the effect of both mining production and tax revenues on test scores, finding a substantial and statistically significant effect for the latter. Transfers to local governments from mining tax revenues are linked to an increase in math test scores of around 0.23 standard deviations. We find that the hiring of permanent teachers as well as the increases in parental employment and improvements in health outcomes of adults and children are plausible mechanisms for such large effect on learning. These findings suggest that redistributive policies could facilitate the accumulation of human capital in resource abundant developing countries as a way to avoid the natural resources curse.

Beyond divide and rule : weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.

Lo ambiental y lo social de la aspersión en Colombia. ¿Política ambiental o estrategia antinarcóticos?

En este artículo se revisan y analizan algunos aspectos del Programa de Erradicación de Cultivos Ilícitos con Glifosato (PECIG) y su Plan de Manejo Ambiental, con el ánimo de demostrar que no consideran de manera adecuada los componentes ambiental y social. Desde la perspectiva de las políticas públicas se demuestra que se ajustan más a una estrategia militar-antinarcóticos que social y medioambiental, contrario al querer transmitido en la definición del instrumento, que habla de la compensación, prevención y mitigación de impactos, la protección de los recursos naturales, del medio ambiente y de la salud de la ciudadanía ubicada en las zonas de influencia directa. Para ello, se hace un recuento de cómo está definido el Programa y los organismos que lo componen; después se explica el Plan de Manejo Ambiental y el análisis de su implementación, posteriormente se muestran los resultados obtenidos de esta verificación para, finalmente, formular las respectivas conclusiones.-----This paper reviews and analyzes issues of the Illicit Crop Eradication Program with Glyphosate (ICEPG) and its Environmental Management Plan, with the aim to demonstrate that the environmental and social components have not been properly considered. From the public policy viewpoint, they are shown to fit more into a military antinarcotics strategy rather than a social and environmental strategy, as opposed to the aims contained in the instrument definition, which talks about impact compensation, prevention, and mitigation; and protection of natural resources, environment, and population’s health within the direct influence areas. For this purpose, an initial review of the Program definition and component organizations is provided; the Environmental Management Plan is explained, its implementation is analyzed; the results from this verification are shown; and, finally, the respective conclusions are formulated.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.